Artem Dinaburg

AI-enabled code assistants (like GitHub’s Copilot, Continue.dev, and Tabby) are making software development faster and more productive. Unfortunately, these tools are often bad at Solidity. So we decided to improve them! To make it easier to write, edit, and understand Solidity with AI-enabled tools, we have: Added support for Solidity into Tabby […]

(Would you get up and throw it away?) [sing to the tune of The Beatles – With A Little Help From My Friends] Here’s a riddle: when new GPUs are constantly being produced, product cycles are ~18-24 months long, and each cycle doubles GPU power (per Huang’s Law), what […]

Today we’re going to provision some cloud infrastructure the Max Power way: by combining automation with unchecked AI output. Unfortunately, this method produces cloud infrastructure code that 1) works and 2) has terrible security properties. In a nutshell, AI-based tools like Claude and ChatGPT readily provide extremely bad cloud infrastructure provisioning code, […]

Earlier this week, at Apple’s WWDC, we finally witnessed Apple’s AI strategy. The videos and live demos were accompanied by two long-form releases: Apple’s Private Cloud Compute and Apple’s On-Device and Server Foundation Models. This blog post is about the latter. So, what is Apple releasing, and how does it compare to […]

eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter) has emerged as the de facto Linux standard for security monitoring and endpoint observability. It is used by technologies such as BPFTrace, Cilium, Pixie, Sysdig, and Falco due to its low overhead and its versatility. There is, however, a dark (but open) secret: eBPF was never intended […]

Trail of Bits has developed a suite of open-source libraries designed to streamline the creation and deployment of eBPF applications. These libraries facilitate efficient process and network event monitoring, function tracing, kernel debug symbol parsing, and eBPF code generation. Previously, deploying portable, dependency-free eBPF applications posed significant challenges due to Linux kernel […]

The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has circulated an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Accountability Policy Request for Comment on what policies can support the development of AI audits, assessments, certifications, and other mechanisms to create earned trust in AI systems. Trail of Bits has submitted a response to the […]

Is artificial intelligence (AI) capable of powering software security audits? Over the last four months, we piloted a project called Toucan to find out. Toucan was intended to integrate OpenAI’s Codex into our Solidity auditing workflow. This experiment went far […]

How quickly can we use brute force to guess a 64-bit number? The short answer is, it all depends on what resources are available. So we’re going to examine this problem starting with the most naive approach and then expand to other techniques involving parallelization. We’ll discuss parallelization at the CPU level with SIMD instructions, […]

Have you ever tried using LLVM’s X-Ray profiling tools to make some flame graphs, but gotten obscure errors like: ==65892==Unable to determine CPU frequency for TSC accounting. ==65892==Unable to determine CPU frequency. Or worse, have you profiled every function in an application, only to find the sum of all function runtimes accounted for ~15 minutes […]

It is time for the second installment of our efforts to reproduce original fuzzing research on modern systems. If you haven’t yet, please read the first part. This time we tackle fuzzing on Windows by reproducing the results of “An Empirical Study of the Robustness of Windows NT Applications Using Random Testing” (aka ‘the NT […]

With 2019 a day away, let’s reflect on the past to see how we can improve. Yes, let’s take a long look back 30 years and reflect on the original fuzzing paper, An Empirical Study of the Reliability of UNIX Utilities, and its 1995 follow-up, Fuzz Revisited, by Barton P. Miller. In this blog post, […]

Today, we’re going to talk about a hard problem that we are working on as part of DARPA’s Cyber Fault-Tolerant Attack Recovery (CFAR) program: automatically protecting software from 0-day exploits, memory corruption, and many currently undiscovered bugs. You might be thinking: “Why bother? Can’t I just compile my code with exploit mitigations like stack guard, […]

This is the second half of our blog post on the Meltdown an Spectre vulnerabilities, describing Spectre Variant 1 (V1) and Spectre Variant 2 (V2). If you have not done so already, please review the first blog post for an accessible review of computer architecture fundamentals. This blog post will start by covering the technical […]

In the past few weeks the details of two critical design flaws in modern processors were finally revealed to the public. Much has been written about the impact of Meltdown and Spectre, but there is scant detail about what these attacks are and how they work. We are going to try our best to fix […]

This blog has promoted control flow integrity (CFI) as a game changing security mitigation and encouraged its use. We wanted to take our own security advice and start securing software we use. To that end, we decided to apply CFI to facebook’s osquery, a cross-platform codebase with which we are deeply familiar. Using osquery, we […]

We’re back with our promised second installment discussing control flow integrity. This time, we will talk about Microsoft’s implementation of control flow integrity. As a reminder, control flow integrity, or CFI, is an exploit mitigation technique that prevents bugs from turning into exploits. For a more detailed explanation, please read the first post in this […]

Our previous blog posts often mentioned control flow integrity, or CFI, but we have never explained what CFI is, how to use it, or why you should care. It’s time to remedy the situation! In this blog post, we’ll explain, at a high level, what CFI is, what it does, what it doesn’t do, and […]

Today, Facebook announced the successful completion of our work: osquery for Windows. “Today, we’re excited to announce the availability of an osquery developer kit for Windows so security teams can build customized solutions for their Windows networks… This port of osquery to Windows gives you the ability to unify endpoint defense and participate in an […]

At the end of last year, we had some free time to explore new and interesting uses of the automated bug-finding technology we developed for the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge. While the rest of the competitors are quietly preparing for the CGC Final Event, we can entertain you with tales of running our bug-finding tools […]

The Cyber Grand Challenge qualifying event was held on June 3rd, at exactly noon Eastern time. At that instant, our Cyber Reasoning System (CRS) was given 131 purposely built insecure programs. During the following 24 hour period, our CRS was able to identify vulnerabilities in 65 of those programs and rewrite 94 of them to […]

This is part two of a two-part blog post that shows how to use KLEE with mcsema to symbolically execute Linux binaries (see the first post!). This part will cover how to build KLEE, mcsema, and provide a detailed example of using them to symbolically execute an existing binary. The binary we’ll be symbolically executing […]

At THREADS 2014, I demonstrated a new capability of mcsema that enables the use of KLEE, a symbolic execution framework, on software available only in binary form. In the talk, I described how to use mcsema and KLEE to learn an unknown protocol defined in a binary that has never been seen before. In the example, […]

We are proud to announce that McSema is now open source! McSema is a framework for analyzing and transforming machine-code programs to LLVM bitcode. It supports translation of x86 machine code, including integer, floating point, and SSE instructions. We previously covered some features of McSema in an earlier blog post and in our talk at ReCON 2014. Our […]

On June 28th Artem Dinaburg and Andrew Ruef will be speaking at REcon 2014 about a project named McSema. McSema is a framework for translating x86 binaries into LLVM bitcode. This translation is the opposite of what happens inside a compiler. A compiler translates LLVM bitcode to x86 machine code. McSema translates x86 machine code into LLVM […]

Artem Dinaburg

Evaluating Solidity support in AI coding assistants

What would you do with that old GPU?

Provisioning cloud infrastructure the wrong way, but faster

Understanding Apple’s On-Device and Server Foundation Models release

Pitfalls of relying on eBPF for security monitoring (and some solutions)

Use our suite of eBPF libraries

Trail of Bits’s Response to NTIA AI Accountability RFC

Codex (and GPT-4) can’t beat humans on smart contract audits

64 Bits ought to be enough for anybody!

TSC Frequency For All: Better Profiling and Benchmarking

Fuzzing In The Year 2000

Fuzzing Like It’s 1989

Protecting Software Against Exploitation with DARPA’s CFAR

An accessible overview of Meltdown and Spectre, Part 2

An accessible overview of Meltdown and Spectre, Part 1

The Challenges of Deploying Security Mitigations

Let’s talk about CFI: Microsoft Edition

Let’s talk about CFI: clang edition

Windows network security now easier with osquery

Hacking for Charity: Automated Bug-finding in LibOTR

How We Fared in the Cyber Grand Challenge

Close Encounters with Symbolic Execution (Part 2)

Close Encounters with Symbolic Execution

McSema is Officially Open Source!

A Preview of McSema