<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>threshold-signatures on The Trail of Bits Blog</title><link>https://miscreants.github.io/blog.trailofbits.com/categories/threshold-signatures/</link><description>Recent content in threshold-signatures on The Trail of Bits Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 20 Sep 2023 08:00:53 -0400</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://miscreants.github.io/blog.trailofbits.com/categories/threshold-signatures/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Don’t overextend your Oblivious Transfer</title><link>https://miscreants.github.io/blog.trailofbits.com/2023/09/20/dont-overextend-your-oblivious-transfer/</link><pubDate>Wed, 20 Sep 2023 08:00:53 -0400</pubDate><guid>https://miscreants.github.io/blog.trailofbits.com/2023/09/20/dont-overextend-your-oblivious-transfer/</guid><description>We found a vulnerability in a threshold signature scheme that allows an attacker to recover the signing key of threshold ECDSA implementations that are based on Oblivious Transfer (OT). A malicious participant of the threshold signing protocols could perform selective abort attacks during the OT extension subprotocol, recover the secret […]</description></item></channel></rss>